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Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Leman Basak Ari

Texas State University-San Marcos, Dept. of Political Science,
Public Administration, basakari@hotmail.com

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Leman Basak Ari

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Dr. Patricia M. Shields

Dr. William DeSoto

About the Author

Leman B. Ari was born in 1977 in San Francisco, CA. She graduated from High School in Istanbul, Turkey and is fluent in Turkish. She graduated from the Texas State University—San Marcos in 2005 with an undergraduate degree in Political Science and a minor in Public Administration. Leman has served as the Editorial Assistant for *Armed Forces & Society* journal. Leman is currently working on earning a Master of Public Administration degree at Texas State University—San Marcos.

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Abstract

The purpose of this project is twofold: to highlight the basic framework scholars use to analyze civil-military relations, and to use that framework to describe the content of twenty recent scholarly articles that examine civil-military relations in Turkey. The normative literature review derives from traditional civil-military relations literature that also provides background for the conceptual framework. The conceptual framework consists of five descriptive categories: civil-military problematic, civilian control, military professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges. These categories are used for the content analysis of the applied research project. The study uses content analysis of the articles on civil-military relations in Turkey. Descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentage) are used to report the results of the content analysis.

Chapter 1 Introduction

Civil-military relations are truly a continuous power struggle between civilians and the military to determine who has the upper hand when dealing with contentious issues (Demirel 2003, 19). A real comprehension of civil-military relations is affirmed by the notion that the behaviors and attitudes of the military and its civilian counterparts do not happen in a vacuum; these are dependent upon one another, and a result of “ongoing interaction” and “a network of relations” (Demirel 2003a, 1; Demirel 2004, 127). They must be seen as “...related and part of a process without...overlooking underlying traits which are less susceptible to change. It is this network which helps to shape mutual perceptions between civilians and soldiers” (Demirel 2004, 127). When such understanding is incomplete, questions of why actors behaved in a certain way or why they have specific views of each other “are destined to remain partial” (Demirel 2004, 127).

The empirical knowledge of civil-military relations includes “direct and indirect dealings that ordinary people and institutions have with the military, legislative haggling over the funding, regulation, and use of the military, and complex bargaining between civilian and military elites to define and implement national security policy” (Burk 2002, 7). Furthermore, these relations vary in form and results depending on if they are seen in mature democracies or emerging democracies (Burk 2002). Scholars such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, Rebecca Schiff, and Edmund Cottey et al. have developed theories to explain the essence of civil-military relations.

After the Cold War ended, the military's traditional role in many Western and non-Western countries was questioned (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005). The changing international environment and the emergence of postmodern militaries resulted in a major evaluation of civil-military relations theories (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005, 439). The fall of communism and the "bipolar world have paved the way for new times in which the armed forces face serious challenges amid the fundamental changes in the international context in which they operate and in the social structure of the societies in which they are embedded" (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005, 439). Each country has its own cultural and historical background, and the military is influenced by those cultural and historical values.

Post-Cold War civil-military relations theories try to explain the influence of the international context on the militaries of the West (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005). These theories also try to explain the new context in which many non-Western countries operate (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005). Recently, most subject countries of these theories are the emerging democracies of the Eastern European countries "who face a serious challenge regarding their roles in the new domestic and international political and strategic environment" (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005, 440). As discussed in the literature review section of this paper, Cottey et al. have focused on the post-communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe.

Although the Central and Eastern European countries are discussed in depth by civil-military relations theories, there is neglect of the Turkish case (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005). Zakaria maintains that Turkey is a "very promising complex case' for democratic consolidation because of its above average GDP and prospects of

EU membership” (Zakaria as cited in Satana, forthcoming). The military in Turkey “...has slowly liberalized, and modernized the country and a constitutional liberal past...” (Zakaria as cited in Satana, forthcoming). Turkey is a culturally and geopolitically unique country that should be considered in the light of its historical heritage when dealing with civil-military relations.

Purpose

The purpose of the applied research project is first to highlight the basic framework scholars use to analyze civil-military relations, and second, to use that framework to describe the content of recent scholarly articles that examine civil-military relations in Turkey.

Thus this study builds upon the work of former MPA student at Texas State University—San Marcos Arjani Oldashi. The conceptual framework and template found in Oldashi’s “Civil-Military Relations in Emerging Democracies as Found in the Articles of Armed Forces & Society” were used to code the articles.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 describes and defines notions and leading theories of civil-military relations. This chapter provides background for the conceptual framework that consists of five descriptive categories. The five categories are civil-military problematic, civilian control, military professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges. Chapter 3 examines the Turkish military and its relationship with larger society from a historical perspective. Chapter 4 includes content analysis methodology on twenty journal articles that discuss civil-military relations in Turkey. Chapter 5 describes how these articles

treated key issues in civil-military relations. Chapter 6 summarizes the applied research project findings.

Chapter 2 Civil-Military Relations

Introduction

The purpose of the literature review is to describe and define notions and leading theories of civil-military relations. The literature provides a background for the conceptual framework that consists of five descriptive categories. These categories are used for the content analysis section of the applied research project. The five descriptive categories are: civil-military problematic, civilian control, professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges.

Theories of Civil-Military Relations

The following section discusses the key theories of civil-military relations. Democratic control of the armed forces is an important component of societal structure and domestic politics. Issues surrounding the control of the military should take into account whether the society is a mature or emerging democracy. Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe during the 1980s, this subject has been a focus of attention during post-communist transitions.

Theories of civil-military relations are the core of this subject. The writings of Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960), who are the founding fathers of civil-military relations theories, are illustrative. The next section introduces some of the major theories of civil-military relations as put forth by Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Peter Feaver, Rebecca Schiff, and Andrew Cottey et al. This review examines

the continuum of civil-military relations theories beginning with Huntington and Janowitz.

Huntington's Normative Theory

Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* (1957) is a classic for anyone studying civil-military relations (Coffman 1991, 69). Huntington's book is a precedent-setting treatment of civil-military relations as a "separate and distinct category of political phenomena" (Larson 1974, 60). Core themes in *The Soldier and the State* have strongly influenced the scholastic and military view on the subject (Larson 1974, 60). In this book, Huntington made, to a certain extent, "the academic field of American military history" legitimate by providing a framework for "the evolution of the American military institution" that differed from the "chronological approach" that features wars and leaders (Coffman 1991, 69).

Huntington's *normative theory* is a cornerstone of traditional civil-military relations theories. His institutional approach model is known as the most "ambitious" and "important" statement about civil-military relations (Feaver 2003, 7). The key theme underlying Huntington's theory is objective civilian control. This policy suggests that civilian leaders should command the military's security policy, but should not interfere with the armed forces' independence in determining "what military operations were required to secure the policy objectives" (Burk 2002, 10). Huntington argues that with the achievement of "objective civilian control" there would be a balancing "distribution of political power" between the civilian and military spheres (Huntington 1957, 83). He explains that objective control establishes a civil-military system that will maximize the security of military "at the least sacrifice of other social values"

(Huntington 1957, 2). Objective civilian control insures the “recognition of autonomous military professionalism” (Huntington 1957, 83). In a system of objective civilian control the military is able to have autonomy in carrying out the wishes of the state while the civilians set the political goals. In other words, the military is obliged to carry out the orders of the civilians, but the civilians make sure the military has autonomy in military matters; for example, the civilians do not give orders to the military about how many soldiers are needed in an operation. As military professionals, the soldiers accept their subordination to the civilians. Thus, military officers would remain politically neutral as a part of their professional ethos.

Under Huntington’s normative theory, the priority of the state is to protect the liberties and rights of citizens (Burk 2002). People need such protection in a complex world in order to pursue their passions (Burk 2002). Huntington uses Hobbes’s liberal theory as a basis of his theory. Like Hobbes he assumes a social contract between the citizens and the state (Burk 2002). A social contract implies that the government’s purpose is to secure its citizens’ natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

It should be noted that the motivation for Huntington’s study, the turmoil of American civil-military relations, was a conflict between his “functional imperative” (“the level of external threat”) and his “societal imperative” (“the constitutional structure of the state and the ideological makeup of the society”) caused by the Cold War (Feaver 2003, 16-17). The functional imperative (the Soviet threat) required the United States to have a great military establishment; however, the societal imperative (“traditional liberal, antimilitary ideology”) prevented an increase in the military forces

(Feaver 2003, 17). Huntington believed that if the liberal society suspended its liberal ideology temporarily, and yielded “control temporarily to the military”, it could protect itself from a long-term external threat (Feaver 2003, 17). Huntington posited that “the tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism” (Huntington 1957, 456). The tradition of liberalism, Huntington asserted, was “the gravest domestic threat to American military security” (Huntington 1957, 457). Therefore, Huntington suggested changing the ideological environment to stand against the Soviet threat in the long run (Huntington 1957, 457).

To explain in detail, Huntington argues that a society’s military institutions are formed by two forces: “a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society” (Huntington 1957, 2). He maintains that military institutions which ponder only social values may be impotent to perform their military function effectively (Huntington 1957). However, it may not be possible to hold military institutions “shaped purely by functional imperatives” within a society (Huntington 1957, 2). According to Huntington, the reciprocal action of these two forces is the center of the civil-military relations problem (Huntington 1957). Huntington’s theory tries to solve this civil-military relations dilemma with “objective civilian control” policy (Burk 2002, 10). His objective approach ensures that the civilians refrain from “interfering in purely military matters and the military stays out of politics” (Cottey, Edmunds and Forster 2002, 33). In sum, Huntington’s normative theory called for a mechanism of objective control where civilians would “dictate policy

objectives and the military would have near complete discretion in implementation” (Shields 2006, 927).

Although Huntington’s and Janowitz’s propositions both apportion a general “overall orientation”, there are significant differences (Larson 1974, 60). Huntington argues for an “autonomous, politically neutral military profession which is isolated from the larger society...” (Larson 1974, 60). He is concerned with the effective “achievement of victory” without concern for nonmilitary matters (Larson 1974, 60). On the other hand, Janowitz advocates a “politically sensitive military profession” that is integrated with society and engaged in the limited use of force to develop healthy international relations (Larson 1974, 60). Next, Janowitz’s civic republican theory is discussed.

Janowitz’ Civic Republican Theory

Morris Janowitz is recognized as the founder of military sociology and *Armed Forces & Society*, a leading interdisciplinary and international journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Thus, he is another founder of civil-military relations theory or, as Feaver (1996, 164) maintains, “the second pillar of American civil-military relations theory” following Huntington.

Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* (1960) is the leading “comprehensive sociological” examination of the military institution (Larson 1974, 61). In this book, he conceptualizes “the military as a whole” by empirically analyzing the central dimensions of “its institutional life”, and employs this comprehension as a foundation “for suggesting changes” that will empower the military to cope with the needs for “security and civil control” (Larson 1974, 61). He deals with the military as a “social

system” where the professional traits of the officer corps become different over time, and that they include “norms and skills” beyond the control of violence (Moskos 1976, 58). Furthermore, Janowitz maintains that the military transmute into a “constabulary force” engaged in the justified use of force to support “viable international relations” where “there is no clear distinction between war and peace or between military and political action” (Larson 1974, 61). The constabulary force would not be a “police force”, but rather a force concerned about keeping peace as well as being prepared for war (Larson 1974, 61).

Janowitz does not accept the “ideal-type division of labor” that Huntington maintains is necessary for military professionalism (Feaver 1996, 164). In fact, he documents the inevitable “politicization of the military,” considering its worldwide reach and the importance of the U.S.-Soviet competition “to both international and domestic politics” (Feaver 1996, 164).

Janowitz also examines Huntington’s functional imperative, which Feaver (1996, 164) calls “military-technical threat environment.” Janowitz maintains that the military ought to be ready to carry out both “strategic deterrence and limited war” (Feaver 1996, 164). This creates a new military function and a “new ideal-type military” auto-conception, the “constabulary concept” (Feaver 1996, 164). According to Janowitz (1960, 418), “the military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory.” Under the constabulary concept, the distinguishing differences between war and peace become lost and “the military derives its inspiring power more from the idea of the police officer rather than the warrior”

(Feaver 1996, 164). Yet, Janowitz is vigilant to stress that the area of operations must be international, not domestic (Feaver 1996).

It may be argued that the military has reached the point of resembling the constabulary force defined by Janowitz, for good and for bad (Feaver 1996). Janowitz acknowledges that military politicization involves a potential “challenge to civilian supremacy” (Feaver 1996, 164). He is concerned that the gradual shift toward the constabulary force may cause greater military “frustration” (Feaver 1996, 164).

According to Janowitz (1960, 435), “the constabulary force concept is designed both to insure the professional competency of the military and to prevent the growth of a disruptive sense of frustration.”

Feaver (1996, 164) maintains that the most valuable contribution of Janowitz to the topic of the civil-military problematique, is his argument about how the politicized military of the Cold War era attempts to “influence civilians and resists unwelcome policy direction.” According to Janowitz (1960, 367-369), regarding the management of foreign affairs, the United States has a unique balance: “highly centralized power in the executive branch, matched by diffusion in the responsibility of the political opposition.” Feaver (1996, 164) explains that the military has been able to match the grand “centralization on national security matters inside the civilian executive branch,” such as the establishment of the National Security Council and Department of Defense, with a greater and more robust effort to earn “access to the pinnacle of civilian power, the White House”

Furthermore, Janowitz’s theory “emphasized the role of the citizen-soldier and how the institution reflected the larger society” (Shields 2006, 927). Janowitz (1960,

234) argues that citizens and “citizen soldiers” are a “refraction of civil society
“wrought by the recruitment system, and by the education and military experiences of a
professional career.” Janowitz (1960) believes that citizen-soldiers as well as citizens
should participate in public life for the good of the community.

Janowitz maintains that with the “changes in technology, society, and missions”
the role of the professional soldier has become “inevitably more political” (Cottey et al.
2002, 33). Concerning this view, Janowitz does not agree with Huntington. On the
contrary, he believes that the United States military has sufficient professional ethics to
make sure that they do not “become involved in politics” (Cottey et al. 2002, 33).

Feaver’s Agency Theory

The contemporary theory of Peter Feaver is *the agency theory*. Feaver’s theory is an
alternative to Huntington’s, and “draws on, modifies, and contributes back to the
general principal-agent literature” (Feaver 2003, 56). Feaver argues that as “civilian
principals” and “military agents” interact they develop “the essence of the civil-military
relations” (Feaver 2003, 2). In other words, he believes that military agents and civilian
leaders are in a “game of strategic interaction” (Feaver 2003, 58).

Feaver seeks to combine considerations about the way agents are “monitored”
(Feaver 2003, 56). His application of principal-agent theory blends two principal
treatments: “incorporating considerations of how agents are monitored and also the
extent to which the preferences of principals and agents converge” (Feaver 2003, 56).
Feaver adds a third consideration: how agents’ behavior “is function of their expectation
that they will be punished if their failure to work is discovered.” He suggests that the

punishment assumption “must be relaxed when analyzing civil-military relations” (Feaver 2003, 56).

According to Feaver (2003, 57), there is a contract between the civilian principal and the military agent to “develop the ability to use force in defense of the civilian’s interests.” When this “contract is established”, the civilian principal monitors the military agent to make sure the agent follows the orders of the civilians (Feaver 2003, 57). By monitoring, the civilian principal also reduces the risk of power abuse (Feaver 2003).

In *Armed Servants* (2003), Feaver introduces the ideas of “working” and “shirking.” When the military shirks its responsibility, civilians lose control. Furthermore, Feaver (2003, 60) states, the problem of shirking occurs because of “civil-military disagreement over means.” Civil-military disagreements may also arise because of goals that derive from “inherent differences in the roles” held by the military and civilians (Feaver 2003, 60). Feaver describes working as the “ideal conduct” of a military agent if the civilian principal were fully aware of what the agent was doing (Feaver 2003, 61). Working is functioning the way civilians desire, and shirking is functioning in a way the military desires that is contrary to civilian direction (Feaver 2003). Feaver (2003, 60) uses the term “shirking” in the civil-military context as a way to describe behavior such as sleeping on duty, plundering, showing disobedience, abusing prisoners of war, or not cleaning one’s weapon.

Working and shirking have many facets because “civilian desiderata” are themselves multifaceted (Feaver 2003, 61). Civilians desire to be protected “from external enemies,” and want “political control” over their fate (Feaver 2003, 61). Feaver

(2003, 61) labels this first goal “functional,” similar to Huntington’s “functional imperative,” and the second goal “relational.” The military agent may behave in ways opposed to the “functional” or “relational” goals; both adverse activities are considered shirking (Feaver 2003, 61).

Feaver (2003, 61) “further disaggregate[s]” functional and relational goals into tasks. The functional goal takes in to account whether the military is following civilian orders; whether the military is working to the highest degree of its duty to carry out the orders of the civilians; and whether the military is capable of carrying out the orders of the civilians (Feaver 2003). On the other hand, “relational” goal includes whether the civilians are the ones “making key policy decisions” and whether the decisions made are real (Feaver uses the term “substantive”) instead of in form (“nominal”) only (Feaver 2003, 61). Another consideration is whether the civilians are the ones who determine which decisions they ought to make, and which decisions should be handled by the military (Feaver 2003, 61).

At the far end of shirking is the traditional concern of a military coup, while at the far end of working is an “ideal-type military” that carries out every civilian order “vigorously” and without corruption (Feaver 2003, 62). The military’s advisory position “complicates the concept of shirking in the civil-military context” (Feaver 2003, 62). Feaver (2003) maintains that “working does not imply that the military” at once and silently fulfills every absurd plot that comes out of any civilian policymaker’s mouth. To counsel civilians on the military consequences of intended “courses of action” is a part of the military’s “obligation” (Feaver 2003, 62). There is an extremely fine line

between “advising against a course of action and resisting civilian efforts to pursue that course of action” (Feaver 2003, 62).

From time to time the military does not agree with civilian direction, and the military leadership communicates their concern to civilians (Feaver 2003). Such communication is not considered shirking; civilians do have a responsibility to consider and evaluate military advice (Feaver 2003). Furthermore, detecting shirking is not as simple as finding out if a particular “military advice was followed” (Feaver 2003, 62). Thus, working and shirking do not mean the same as winning and losing on the battleground (Feaver 2003, 64-65). Victory on the battlefield happens because of a successful interaction against an enemy (Feaver 2003, 65). “One side can ‘work’ but still lose if the other side” has greater force, or if the aim is misjudged (Feaver 2003, 65). Similarly, “one side can ‘shirk’ and still win” if the enemy is not as capable, or if the duty the civilian ordered was “not appropriate for the security goal” (Feaver 2003, 65).

On a different note, the “strategic game” of civil-military relations between military agents and civilian principals begins when the civilians decide “how to monitor the military” (Feaver 2003, 99). Feaver (2003, 99) maintains that in order to grasp “how civilians will monitor” instead of “how they ought to monitor,” one needs to use a “theory of civilian motivation.” The agency model preserves “observable patterns of civil-military relations” that combine civilian decisions related to “intrusive monitoring” and military decisions “regarding working and shirking—as a function of other potentially observable factors” such as “the costs of monitoring” and “the

probabilities of being punished” (Feaver 2003, 112). Below, this review moves away from theories that are most applicable to industrialized, mature democracies.

Schiff’s Concordance Theory

Political scientist Rebecca L. Schiff (1995, 7) discusses how “current civil-military relations theory” highlights the physical and ideological separation of political and military institutions. Her alternative, *concordance theory*, proposes that “three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship” that does not require separation (Schiff 1995, 7). Concordance theory “highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society” (Schiff 1995, 12). Schiff’s concordance model suggests a high level of unity “between the military and other parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship” (Schiff 1995, 7). She maintains that “the ability of the three partners involved to agree on four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style” is more important than the “type of civil-military relationship adopted” (Schiff 1995, 8). Concordance theory “achieves two goals: first, it explains the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relations among military, the political elites, and society; second, it predicts that if three partners agree on the four indicators, domestic military intervention is less likely to occur” (Schiff 1995, 8).

Schiff (1995, 8) sees “two problems with the current theory of separation that concordance theory resolves.” First, the current theory rests largely on the United States’ experience, and “assumes that American institutional separation should be”

practiced in all nations to hinder “domestic military intervention” (Schiff 1995, 8). However, she argues that the American case is derived from “a particular historical and cultural experience” and may not be applicable to other countries (Schiff 1995, 8). By contrast, Schiff’s concordance theory takes in to account “the unique historical and cultural experiences” of other nations that may lead to other types of civil-military relations that differ from the United States’ example (Schiff 1995, 8).

Second, the current theory advocates “the separation of civil military institutions,” and its core is “institutional analysis” (Schiff 1995, 8). Yet this analysis does not consider “the cultural and historical” circumstances “that may encourage or discourage” the institutional separation of civil-military spheres (Schiff 1995, 8). Concordance theory “moves beyond institutional analysis” by directing attention to issues about “a nation’s culture” (Schiff 1995, 8). Current international events prove that “ethnic orientations and issues of multicultural diversity are in fact causes of the domestic unrest now found throughout the world” (Schiff 1995, 8). Concordance theory “operationalizes” the unique “institutional and cultural indicators” and points out the “empirical conditions under which the military, the government, and the society may agree on separate, integrated, or other forms of civil-military relations” to hinder domestic military intervention (Schiff 1995, 8).

Schiff (1995, 8) maintains that “concordance theory describes a concordance among” the three partners (the military, the citizenry, and the political elites) “found in a wide range of cultures (including the U.S, where there has been long substantial agreement among all sectors of the society about the role of the armed forces).” It prescribes this theory to prevent domestic military intervention that adapts to different

cultures (Schiff 1995, 8-9). Two cases studied in Schiff's article "challenge the current theory" and demonstrate the significance of concordance theory: Israel and India (Schiff 1995, 9). Israel, "a nation under a high level of external threat conditions, has a virtual absence of civil institutions," yet has never undergone domestic military intervention (Schiff 1995, 9). Dependent upon its military, "India's civil institutions have been in decline for several years; and yet the armed forces have not intervened" (Schiff 1995, 9). Schiff (1995, 9) posits that, "these nations reflect the importance of indigenous political institutions and culture as they bear on the military."

Concordance theory does not disregard "the importance of outside threat conditions;" rather, in agreement with "current civil-military relations theory, domestic politics" is the central focus (Schiff 1995, 9). "What sets concordance theory apart from both Realism and the current theory" is its primary focus on culture as a great influence on "political and military institutions," as well as society (Schiff 1995, 9).

Schiff's central argument is that if the three partners attain concordance on four indicators, "the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style," then domestic military intervention is less likely to occur (Schiff 1995, 12). Concordance theory "explains the specific conditions determining the military's role in the domestic sphere that includes the government and society" (Schiff 1995, 12). Concordance theory does not demand a specific "form of government, set of institutions or decision-making process" (Schiff 1995, 12). However, it usually occurs in the circumstances surrounding "active agreement, whether established by legislation, decree, or constitution, or based on longstanding historical and cultural values" (Schiff 1995, 12). Cooperative association

and harmony of opinion on four particular indicators “may result in a range of civil-military patterns” such as separation, the elimination of “civil-military boundaries, and other variations” (Schiff 1995, 12).

As discussed earlier, the concordance model sees “the military, the political leadership and the citizenry as partners” and assumes that when they have mutual harmony of opinion about the armed forces’ role military intervention is less probable (Schiff 1995, 12-13). The first partner, the military, includes “the armed forces and the personnel” (Schiff 1995, 13). According to Schiff (1995, 13) “the officers and enlisted personnel are usually those most dedicated to the maintenance of the armed forces” (Schiff 1995, 13).

Schiff (1995, 13) defines the second partner, the political leadership, “in terms of function.” The basic constitution of governmental institutions and the means of their selection are considered less important than is determining “the elites who represent the government and have direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces” (Schiff 1995, 13). Hence, the governmental elites include “cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments, and monarchies” (Schiff 1995, 13).

Schiff describes the third partner, citizenry, as “even more varied” and “best defined by function” (Schiff 1995, 13). She asks, “How do citizens interact with the military? And is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role of military in society?” (Schiff 1995, 13). She points out that the available civil-military relations literature does not regard the citizenry, but rather political institutions, as being the pillar “‘civil’ component of analysis” (Schiff 1995, 13). In contrast, Schiff’s concordance model “considers the citizenry” as a crucial partner of “the military and the

political elites” (Schiff 1995, 13). Thus her model is not limited to an “institutional analysis, but incorporates additional components of society” which influence the armed forces’ place and function (Schiff 1995, 13).

Cottey et al.’s “Second Generation Problematic”

Cottey et al.’s (2002) study focuses on civil-military relations and democratization in post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. They argue that the assumption that “the primary problems [of democracy and civil-military relations in Eastern Europe] are the threat of praetorian military intervention in domestic politics” is distorted (Cottey et al. 2002, 31). They suggest that “the debate on the relationship between democracy and civil-military relations needs to be reconceptualized in terms of democratic governance of the defense and security sector” (Cottey et al. 2002, 31-32). They believe such a reconceptualization would shift the focus to “the wider problem of the democratic management and implementation of defense and security policy” (Cottey et al. 2002, 32). This shift could be understood as “a shift from the first generation problem of reforming core institutions for the political control of armed forces to a second generation problem of establishing effective structures for the democratic governance of the defense and security sectors” (Cottey et al. 2002, 32).

In practice, the second generation reform issues are “issues of state capacity; that is, the ability of democratic state structures to provide for the effective management of the armed forces and defense policy” (Cottey et al. 2002, 40). Three challenges are central to “establishing effective democratic control over defense policy” in the emerging democracies of post-communist Eastern Europe: “the development of effective structures for the planning and implementation of defense policy; the

development of effective systems for parliamentary oversight of civil-military relations and defense policy; and engagement of civil society as a core component of oversight and accountability in defense and security matters” (Cottey et al. 2002, 41). Effective defense policy-making requires being able to “implement the policy once decisions have been made” (Cottey et al. 2002, 41). The ability to implement policy depends on “the relationship between resources and policy choices; and the ability of state bureaucratic structures to implement policy decisions...also on lower level bureaucratic structures and suitably qualified and trained civil servants” (Cottey et al. 2002, 41). In post-communist Eastern Europe, the key problem has been “this lack of depth in institutional mechanisms for control of armed forces and defense policy” (Cottey et al. 2002, 41).

The next section introduces the foundation of the conceptual framework, which is later transformed into categories for the content analysis portion of the applied research project, starting with the civil-military problematic.

Civil-Military Problematic

At the heart of all civil-military relations theories is a paradox often referred to as the civil-military problematic. Feaver (2003, 4) maintains that “civil-military problematic is thus a simple paradox: the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.” The civil-military problematic establishes the need for some kind of civilian control. According to Huntington (1957, 2), the “nub of the problem of civil military relations” is the interaction of two forces—the functional imperative and societal imperative. Huntington (1957, 2) describes the functional imperative as “stemming from the threats

to the society's security;" and the societal imperative as "arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society."

Feaver (2003) discusses the civil-military problematic as a strategic game between principals (civilians) and their agents (military). Civilian control is exerted when the military works and is diminished when the military shirks its responsibility (Feaver 2003). The question of civilian control thus is, how do they get the armed forces to work and not shirk when directed?

The military needs *coercive power* to protect society, but the risk is that the army may misuse this power to accomplish its own interests. According to Feaver (2003, 4) "once established, however, the coercive power is itself a potential threat to the interests of the political group it is meant to protect. Managing the coercive power of the military—making sure that those who govern do not become a tyranny to the governed—is the central focus of civil-military relations."

Huntington (1957) argues that the *balance of power* and respect between the civilian and military groups creates effective civil-military relations. Military officers and political leaders share responsibility in civilian control-based regimes. This balance is a complex issue.

The balance of power is kept in check by the *partisan neutrality* of the military. Over time, civilians of different political perspectives can maintain control because the military is neutral politically. The partisan neutrality of the military helps to guarantee they will not be involved in political power struggles and tip the balance. In other words, "the area of military science is subordinate to and yet independent of the area of

politics” (Huntington 1957, 71). Hence, the military is obliged to obey the politicians decisions, but has autonomy in their implementation.

Military *obedience* to civilian authority is another way the balance is maintained. Huntington defines obedience as the supreme military virtue “upon which all other virtues exist” (Huntington 1957, 74). Huntington (1957, 74) argues that army officers will be “the obedient servants of the state only if they are motivated by military ideals.” This would assure civilian control. Huntington (1957, 74) believes that “the purpose of obedience is to further the objective of the superior.” The nature of obedience can be complex. Feaver (2003, 5) asks whether the military will obey its civilian masters, or “will its latent strength allow it to resist civilian direction and pursue its own interests?” Feaver’s (2003) agency theory focuses on the nature of military obedience. In particular, he examines factors associated with the military’s failure to obey (shirking).

Today the *military* has *functions other than security*, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian roles (Oldashi 2002). It would be desirable to see military forces deployed to assist civilians following unexpected natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. These new roles complicate the nature and dimensions of the civil-military problematic by changing the role of the military in society.

Civilian Control

Civilian control is another important category used to study civil-military relations. Because the military has the potential to become a threat, much of civil-military relations theory involves discussion of how civilians can control the military. Civilian control is concerned with “the relative power of civilian and military groups” (Huntington 1957, 80). It decreases when the military becomes increasingly involved in

institutional and constitutional politics (Huntington 1957, 83). A military coup is an example of complete breakdown of civilian control. Therefore, civilian control is “achieved to the extent to which the power of military groups is reduced” (Huntington 1957, 80). Huntington (1957, 80) maintains that “the general concept of civilian control is identified with the specific interests of one or more civilian groups.” Thus, the frequently asked question is “how can military power be minimized?” (Huntington 1957, 80). It can be minimized through two forms of control: *subjective* and *objective* civilian control (Huntington 1957, 80). Huntington maintains that civilian control is seen in mature democracies, while military control is seen in totalitarian governments (Huntington 1957). However, the danger is that even in the democratic process the military might weaken civilian control and gain political power by manipulating the legitimate processes and democratic government bodies where civilian control reside (Huntington 1957, 82).

Huntington (1957, 80) defines subjective civilian control as “maximizing civilian power” in relation to the military. It is impossible, however, to maximize civilian power as a whole because of the conflicting interests, great number, and diverse characteristics of civilian groups (Huntington 1957). Therefore, this effort frequently maximizes the power of certain groups that are involved in civilian control of the military (Huntington 1957). As a result, subjective civilian control is part of the relationships and power struggles between civilian groups (Huntington 1957). Huntington (1957, 81) posits that, “subjective civilian control is the only form of civilian control possible in the absence of a professional officer corps.” Moreover, it has been associated with the “maximization of the power” of certain governing bodies, certain social classes, and certain

constitutional forms (Huntington 1957, 81). According to Huntington (1957, 83), “the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere.” Thus, subjective civilian control “achieves its end by civilizing the military” (Huntington 1957, 83).

Objective civilian control is the opposite of subjective civilian control, which is “maximizing military professionalism” (Huntington 1957, 83). Huntington (1957, 83) maintains that “the essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism.” In other words, objective civilian control minimizes military power by “professionalizing the military” and making them politically neutral (Huntington 1957, 84). In this scenario, the military holds little political power while preserving the imperative element of power and security that is essential to the military profession’s existence (Huntington 1957).

Military Professionalism

A nation’s officer corps is responsible for defining what military professionalism means. Hence, civil-military relation theory focuses on the relationship between the officer corps and the state. Civilians trust the military to obey because obedience is part of their professional ethos. Professionalism in the military is thus a core subject of civil-military relations. The process of professionalism began in the 20th century when the military officer was transformed into a professional soldier. As early as 1957, Huntington (1957, 7) posited that “The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man.” According to Huntington (1957, 35), “a professional officer is imbued with the ideal of service to the nation.” Consequently, professional officers are easier to control. One way to maintain civilian control is

through a *professional officer corps*. According to Oldashi (2002, 18-19), “professionalism distinguishes the military officer of late 20th century from the fighters of the previous ages.” She further posits that “the existence of the officer corps [armed forces, army, navy, air force] as a professional body gives the modern problem of civil-military relations a unique character” (Oldashi 2002, 19).

Janowitz (1960, 6), another founding father of civil-military relations theory, believes “a profession is more than a group with special skill, acquired through intensive training. A professional group develops a sense of group identity and a system of internal administration.” Janowitz (1960, 6) describes professionalism as an “element of desirable behavior.” According to him “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness” are three major factors in military professionalism (Janowitz 1960, 6). Corporatism refers to “officers as members of a profession that share a sense of organic unity” (Janowitz 1960, 6).

According to Cottey et al. (2002, 33), “civilian control of the military is best understood and maintained through regimes of ‘*shared responsibility*’ between civilian leaders and military officers.” These regimes develop “according to particular national circumstances, and work according to ‘principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge” (Cottey et al. 2002, 33).

Institutional Structures

Operational control of the military occurs through institutional structures. Hence, the *roles of the executive, the legislative branch, and the bureaucracy* are important factors in the overall theory of civil-military relations. Civilian political leaders are found in the executive and legislative branches, and are responsible for military defense

policy. Defense policy is the mechanism civilians use to direct military action. Institutional structures are the mechanism used to monitor military behavior and thus detect working and shirking. They also use these structures to punish a military that is shirking. Oldashi (2002, 24) maintains that, “defense policy making, its development and implementation are keys to democratic control of the armed forces.” This democratic control depends upon key state capabilities, such as the ability to obtain information and provide analysis to the political leaders (e.g., *technical support*). In addition, political leaders need to have the correct estimates of resources. This information enables political leaders to distinguish between policy choices. If a political leader has skilled and trained civil servants to assist in policy implementation, this significantly increases the likelihood of effective civilian control. Effective implementation at the top levels (“governmental/ministerial control”) of defense policy is not enough (Cottey et al. 2002, 41). Problems with civilian control in Eastern Europe reveal the importance of low-level civil servants and mature bureaucratic institutions (Cottey et al. 2002).

Shields (2003, 181) quotes Janowitz and Little (1965), “military life is, in short, institutional life.” She maintains that, “it is difficult to imagine how soldiers would be recruited, trained, and deployed without supportive bureaucratic apparatus” (Shields 2003, 181). Furthermore, she posits that “A corrupt military bureaucracy threatens citizens, allies, foes. An effective bureaucracy promotes military professionalism, seamlessly implements complicated logistics, and procures the best weapons for the job. Bureaucracies get things done but their red tape is a source of endless frustration” (Shields 2003, 181).

The *legislature's essential function* is its ability to examine policy, maintain “control over the defense budget,” and accept or reject legislation (Cottey et al. 2002, 44). The defense policy involvement of the legislature presents a significant “element of democratic legitimacy concerning” civil-military relations of a state (Cottey et al. 2002, 44).

Challenges

This section addresses the theoretical differences between young democracies (such as those in Eastern European) and mature democracies. The elements of the challenges category in the conceptual framework include engagement of civil society, transparency/openness to public records, parliamentary oversight, civil autonomous organizations present, relations with international organizations, and internal security forces. Implicit in the theories of Huntington, Janowitz, and Feaver is the existence of a democratically elected civilian leadership. One challenge is to make this connection between civilian control within a democracy compared to an individual leader (such as a president or prime minister); legislative bodies such as parliaments have a larger democratic component. The military is better able to engage civil society through the legislative branch (*vis-à-vis* the executive).

According to Cottey et al. (2002, 46) the larger question of the *engagement of civil society* “with defense and security issues” is neglected, even though it is an important part of “democratic civil-military relations.” Civil society’s contribution to this relationship consists of “formal and informal organizations and groups that contribute to debate on defense and security policy issues” (Cottey et al. 2002, 47). Examples of these organizations include “the media, nongovernmental organizations

[NGOs], including specialist think-tanks, pressure groups and so on, and defense academics in universities” (Cottey et al. 2002, 47). These groups satisfy functions such as being “an alternative, nongovernmental source of information on defense and security issues” providing “the opportunity for popular debate, discussion, and criticism of defense and security matters” and acting “as an important mechanism for holding other actors in the civil-military relationship to account” (Cottey et al. 2002, 47). In general, it is possible to say that in Western democracies, NGOs participate in most of societal issues including civil society engagement and civil-military relations. On the other hand, in emerging democracies, this involvement is quite poor and dysfunctional. In democratic states those who participate “shape and contribute to debates on public policy issues” however, this participation is quite weak in emerging democracies (Cottey et al. 2002, 46).

Another challenge is expertise of *parliamentary oversight* (Oldashi 2002). In representative democracies, legislatures serve the function of “holding the executive and bureaucracy” responsible by scrutinizing legislation and public policy (Cottey et al. 2002, 44). Effective parliamentary oversight of the military and defense policy “depends on both the formal constitutional or legally defined powers of the legislature and the capacity of the legislature to exercise those powers in an effective and meaningful way in practice” (Cottey et al. 2002, 44).

In emerging democracies, new legislatures may be unwilling or unable to check the bureaucracy and executive. For example, in post-communist Europe, limited and poor parliamentary oversight of defense policy undermines democratic legitimacy (Cottey et al. 2002). Eastern Europe is deficient in defense and security expertise, which

“undermines the process of parliamentary oversight by preventing the overseers from carrying out their task efficiently—even if they want to” (Cottey et al. 2002, 45).

Relations with international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) “create new layers of civilian-military relations as they anticipate military cooperation and coordinated civilian control of military activities across national borders” (Burk 2002, 20). NATO has established civil-military relationships with mature democracies, but such relationships are not well established with emerging democracies; these countries are in transition. International organizations raise new questions about the way militaries work to protect and maintain democratic values on a transnational level (Burk 2002). The members of NATO and EU must satisfy certain criteria in order to gain admission to these organizations. The difficulty of meeting these requirements restricts “the expansion of NATO” in the post-communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Burk 2002, 20).

Oldashi (2002, 27) posits that *transparency* is an important factor “for checks and balances among branches of governments in order to prevent abuse of power.” A government needs transparency of its decisions through press and media for accountability (Cottey et al. 2002). If this transparency and openness of public records are missing, such as in the emerging democracies as a result of “limited societal capacity,” this significantly affects the governmental performance (Cottey et al. 2002, 47). In developing nations of central and Eastern Europe civilian engagement in security and defense matters were limited “at an official level” and “nonofficial, popular engagement was almost nonexistent” (Cottey et al. 2002, 47). For example, the Czech

Republic has “no nongovernmental sources of defense expertise” that Defense Ministry officials or “members of the parliamentary defense committee can use in the policymaking process” (Cotter et al. 2002, 47). Thus, the Czech media rarely covers the “issues of defense and security” in its press; this results in a lack of information on government policies (Cotter et al. 2002, 47-48).

Traditional civil-military relations literature treats a country’s “regular military – that is to say the army, navy, and air force” as the essential focus of attention (Cotter et al. 2002, 39). However, many other countries have “other significant militarized formations, such as paramilitary police forces” or *internal security forces*” (Cotter et al. 2002, 39). These formations can be more “politically influential...than the regular armed forces” in some cases; one example is the “Interior Ministry forces” of the Milosevic regime during the Kosovo conflict (Cotter et al. 2002, 39). “The political-institutional arrangements for control of such forces and the legislation covering their activities” are usually different from those of the regular armed forces (Cotter et al. 2002, 40).

Conceptual Framework

A review of the literature on civil-military relations has established the categories of the conceptual framework (refer to table 2.1). In order to describe civil-military relations, descriptive categories are employed. The five descriptive categories are: civil-military problematic, civilian control, military professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges of emerging democracies.

Table 2.1 Conceptual Framework linked to the literature

<p>Civil-Military problematic</p> <p>Coercive power</p> <p>Balanced power</p> <p>Partisan neutrality</p> <p>Obedience to the state leadership</p> <p>Functions of military other than security</p>	<p>Oldashi (2002), Feaver (2003), Shields (2006), Segal (1983), Burk (2002), Cottey et al. (2002) Huntington (1964), Schiff (1995) McGowan (2006), Feaver (1996) Janowitz (1960)</p>
<p>Civilian control</p> <p>Objective civilian control</p> <p>Subjective civilian control</p>	<p>Oldashi (2002), Huntington (1964) Burk (2002), Larson (1974) Mandel (2001), Janowitz (1977) Feaver (1996)</p>
<p>Military professionalism</p> <p>Professional officer corps [armed forces, army, Navy, Air force]</p> <p>Shared responsibility</p>	<p>Oldashi (2002), Janowitz (1960) Burk (2002), Segal (1983) Moskos (1976), Larson (1974) Huntington (1964), Cottey et al. (2002), Schiff (1995), Janowitz (1977)</p>
<p>Institutional structures (Civilian leadership)</p> <p>Role of executive</p> <p>Role of bureaucracy</p> <p>Technical support</p> <p>Role of legislature</p>	<p>Oldashi (2002) Burk (2002) Janowitz (1960) Shields (2003)</p>
<p>Challenges</p> <p>Engagement of civic society</p> <p>Transparency-openness to public records; press and media</p> <p>Expertise of parliamentary oversight</p> <p>Civil autonomous organizations present</p> <p>Relations with international organization</p> <p>Internal security forces</p>	<p>Oldashi (2002) Burk (2002) Feaver (2003) Cottey et al. (2002)</p>

Chapter 3 Turkey: Historical Perspective

Introduction

The purpose of chapter 3 is to examine the history and roles of the Turkish military and its relationship with larger society. In addition, the chapter describes some unique features of Turkey both in geopolitical context and regarding its internal civil-military organization. Ottoman and Turkish historians agree that “the military institution has been” the leading force behind the transformation of “the social, economic and political structure of the Turkish state” (Karabelias 1999, 130). Lerner and Robinson argue that “it was the military corps that named and the military prestige that sustained the leader—once a Sultan Caliph, now a President” (as cited in Karabelias 1999, 130).

Historical Overview

The settling of “Turkish nomadic populations in Anatolia” during the eight and ninth centuries AD, the forming of their early states, and “the expansion of their territorial borders” profoundly affected their political organization (Karabelias 1999, 130). “The political life of the Ottoman state” was generally dominated by two sociopolitical groups: the *askeri* (ruling class), which consisted of “the Sultan, the higher ranks of the military and the bureaucracy, ...the *ulema* [Moslem theologians and scholars]; and the *re'aya* [primary producers or peasants] composed of the Muslim and non-Muslim population” that lived in the state but played “no direct role in government” (Karabelias 1999, 130). The military institution had a controlling role in the establishment and “preservation of the Ottoman Empire” (Karabelias 1999, 130). The Ottoman government “had been an Army before it was anything else... in fact, Army and Government were one. War was the external purpose, Government the internal purpose, of one institution, composed of one body of men” (Lybyer, as cited in

Karabelias 1999, 130). The successful expansion of the Ottoman Empire into three continents (Asia, Africa and Europe) and “its subsequent disintegration” was the reason for an increasing level of competition for “political power among the members of the ruling group” (Karabelias 1999, 130). The outcome of these competitions had an important “effect on the foundations of the modern Turkish state” (Karabelias 1999, 130).

The Ottoman Army

As the empire extended, the efforts of the sultans to maintain political power “over the cavalry corps, the *Sipahis*, led gradually” to the establishment of “a salaried infantry corps under their direct command, the *Yeniceri* [The Janissary, new soldiers]” (Karabelias 1999, 130-131). The appearance of ineffective sultans caused the *yeniceri* “to realize their corporate strength” and gave them the opportunity to engage in “a more direct role in the political affairs of the [Ottoman] Empire” (Karabelias 1999, 131). According to Berkes (1964, 61) “the *Yeniceris* were now engaged in interfering in state affairs or in rebellion and plunder when their demands were not accepted.” Some sultans tried to form “a modern, Western-educated and trained, military and civil bureaucracy...in an attempt to save the Empire from internal disintegration and restore it as well as their political position to its previous glory” (Karabelias 1999, 131). Although “the new military and civil bureaucratic corps” were initially successful in the re-establishment of the imperial power to its former strong position, “the new ideas which had been circulated among its members led to the redistribution of political control in the ruling group” (Karabelias 1999, 131).

The “high-ranking members of the military and civil bureaucracy” were exposed to “Western political ideas and ideals” (Karabelias 1999, 131). This exposure, combined with the growing “intervention of the state in the” daily lives of “the Ottoman subjects and the inability of the central government to improve the financial and military strength of the Empire” caused the rule of the sultan to descend into corruption and decline (Karabelias 1999, 131).

The yeniceri army was abolished in 1826 (Kili 2003). The new army was patterned after Western models (Kili 2003). The new officer corps was “committed to the furtherance of the process of modernization” (Kili 2003, 148). The proclamation of the Rescript of Gulhane by Rashid Pasha in 1839 began a period of “reform called the Tanzimat which continued up to 1876” (Kili 2003, 148). The imperial rescript enabled “reforms in the judicial, administrative, financial and military fields, and in the system of taxation” (Kili 2003, 148). It also included “a list of rights as to the securing of life, honor, and property of all Ottoman subjects, and it emphasized the equality of all Ottoman citizens before the law” (Kili 2003, 148). Tanzimat leaders made “important administrative, judicial, military, financial, and educational reforms” (Kili 2003, 148). They also adopted “new legal codes” and established new institutions (Kili 2003, 149). The Tanzimat reforms created a “friction between the old and new—the maintenance of historic Islamic institutions and the formation of modern institutions” (Kili 2003, 149).

During the Tanzimat period in the 1860s a movement called The Young Ottoman started (Kili 2003). This movement was started “by a group of army officers, bureaucrats and writers who believed the Tanzimat reforms [were] inadequate and demanded the establishment of constitutional monarchy” (Kili 2003, 149). During the

Young Ottoman movement “leadership in modernization passed principally into the hands of high army officials” (Kili 2003, 149). The Young Ottoman activities “led to the proclamation of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876,” followed by the opening of the first Ottoman Parliament in 1877 (Kili 2003, 149).

Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), who was against the constitutional ideas of the Young Ottomans closed the parliament in 1878 using the excuse of “emergency conditions and the inexperience of the people” involved in constitutional government practices (Kili 2003, 149). The 1876 Constitution was set aside without receiving “any official recognition for a period of thirty years, and the country plunged into an era of despotism” (Kili 2003, 149).

Protest against Abdulhamid II’s absolutism caused “the second phase of the new Young Turk (formerly known as Young Ottoman) movement” (Kili 2003, 149). The “most important members of this movement” were “army officers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals” (Kili 2003, 149). The pioneers of “the drive toward re-establishing constitutional government” were the officer corps (Kili 2003, 149). Kili (2003, 149) points out that “commitment to constitutional government is not a usual pattern of commitment for the military in many countries of the world.”

The 1908 revolution united “the civilian and military members of the Young Turk movement” (Kili 2003, 149). Members of “these two groups in Macedonia sent a flood of telegrams to Abdulhamid in July 1908, threatening that there would be widespread revolts and the crown prince would be proclaimed Sultan unless the 1876 Constitution was reinstated” (Kili 2003, 150). The constitution was reinstated “during the same month” by Abdulhamid, and the parliament was reopened “following the election of

deputies” (Kili 2003, 150). During the Second Constitutional Period a religious opposition formed in reaction to modernist forces (Kili 2003). An uprising known as the Thirty-first of March Incident “was staged by the reactionary religious groups” in 1909 (Kili 2003, 150). The army “put down this reactionary revolt” (Kili 2003, 150). Since Abdulhamid II was accused of having staged the uprising, he was obliged “to abdicate his throne” and Mehmed V replaced him (Kili 2003, 150).

Efforts to sustain the Ottoman Empire by initiating numerous reforms were not enough for the survival of the empire (Kili 2003). However, these reforms enabled “the training of certain social groups imbued with a sense of public service and with an increasing dedication to modernization” (Kili 2003, 150). The most important among them “were army officers, civil servants and some intellectuals” who were motivated by “a sense of national consciousness” (Kili 2003, 150).

The Ottoman Empire was overthrown during World War I. The result was a period of National Struggle (1919-1922), and “the birth of a nation under fire” (Berkes 1964, 450). The “question for the Turks” shifted from maintaining the Ottoman Empire to sustaining “their very homeland” (Kili 2003, 150). This national crisis “rallied people from all social” levels to defend their homeland (Kili 2003, 150). The National Struggle “made patent the political and legal boundaries of the Turkish homeland” (Kili 2003, 150). The Republic’s establishment and the Ataturk (founding father of the Turkish Republic) reforms followed (Kili 2003). From imperial collapse, “partition, and occupation in 1920, the Turkish Republic emerged three years later as an internationally recognized, independent nation-state” (Narli 2000, 107).

During the National Struggle and the establishment of a new nation, “the military became not only the Republic’s defenders, but also the guardians of secularism and the six principles of [Kemalist tradition of Ataturk]” (Narli 2000, 108). Kemal Ataturk was the founding father of the Turkish Republic (1923). The six principles of Kemalism are nationalism, secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and reformism (Narli 2000). As Heper and Shifrinson (2005, 242) posit, “Ataturk emphasized that the Turkish military was the guardian of the state with its Kemalist tradition and hence above politics.” The Turkish military became the shield of the secular republic and acted as a protector “between the civilian and military functions” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 242). Furthermore, Ataturk established a “secular-democratic republic” and separated “the military and civilian spheres” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 237). However, “unlike Western European states,” modern Turkey developed along hierarchical lines inherited from the Ottoman society (Narli 2000, 107). The “Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties continued” until the Republican era. This close relationship gave “the armed forces a preeminent role in society” and the civil sphere (Narli 2000, 108).

Although the republic was established in 1923, Heper and Shifrinson (2005, 237) note that “at the end of the twentieth century civil-military relations in Turkey display some resemblance to those in the advanced democracies.” But Turkey had four so-called military interventions during the twentieth century, and “the military felt it could use a veto power whenever it came to the conclusion that the civilians” could not protect the country from internal and external threats (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 241). Hence, the Turkish case is “significantly different from civil-military relations in advanced democracies” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 241). On the other hand,

“important recent development in Turkey” makes it “possible to suggest” that civil-military relations in the country “have begun to take a turn toward the ones in advanced democracies” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 241). The military saw democracy “as an *end* rather than a means. Whenever it intervened directly or indirectly, officers blamed politicians but not *democracy* itself” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 240). As a result, “the first three military interventions (1960-1960, 1971-1973, and 1980-1983) were guardian type - military clearing the political mess and then returning to their barracks ” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 240). The last intervention in 1997 “was of the displacement type – military replacing one civilian government by another. Significantly, the military interventions were never of the ruler type – military trying to stay in power as long as possible” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 240).

Turkey has been a NATO member since 1952. The Turkish military “was modernized largely following Turkey’s joining NATO” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 244). Professionalism occurred in the Turkish military “not when [it] experienced autonomy, but rather when Turkey joined NATO, which in turn led them to the questioning the civilian leadership” (Heper and Shifrinson 2005, 244). Heper and Shifrinson (2005, 244) maintain that the Turkish military “remained non-politicized despite global reach.” Furthermore, Heper and Shifrinson (2005, 244) posit that “Recent civil-military relations in Turkey can be explained by a combination of a type of self-restraint exercised by the military, civilians’ changing their conduct of politics, and more recently the military following suit as well as the ‘carrot policy’ of some international organizations.” As a member of NATO in 2005, the Turkish military had approximately 800,000 members and was “the most prominent structure in Turkey”

(Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005, 441). Turkey has the biggest army among European NATO members.

Turkey's NATO membership "has not been a precondition for democratic control of its armed forces" (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005, 440). However, in order to become an EU member Turkey has to fulfill the political chapter of the Copenhagen criteria (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005). Among "the most important conditions [of] the political criteria has been the democratic control of the military in Turkey" (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005, 441). Ironically, the military's outstanding role in Turkey's political affairs has been "a major obstacle to the country's integration into the EU, a longstanding foreign policy goal" (Narli 2000, 107). Since Turkey has been pushing hard recently for EU membership, "the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey" has become even more significant (Narli 2000, 107).

Chapter 4 Methodology

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to describe the content of recent scholarly articles that examine civil-military relations in Turkey. The methodology used to describe these articles is content analysis. The framework used to code the articles was operationalized by using Arjana Oldashi's (2002, 40) template, as described in "Civil-Military Relations in Emerging Democracies as Found in the Articles of Armed Forces & Society."

Content Analysis

Earl Babbie (2004, 314) described content analysis as "the study of recorded human communications, such as books, Web sites, paintings, and laws." Content analysis employs descriptive categories as a research method. The research question it addresses is "what" (Babbie 2004, 314). The data collected using content analysis question "'why' and 'with what effect'" (Babbie 2004, 314). A coding sheet was borrowed from Oldashi's (2002) template. The descriptive categories used in the conceptual framework were used to establish the coding sheet.

Table 4.1 Coding Sheet

Research entity: Turkey			
Information breakdown:			
Civil-Military Problematic			
Coercive power	SD	LD	N
Balanced power	SD	LD	N
Partisan neutrality	SD	LD	N
Obedience to the state leadership	SD	LD	N
Functions of military other than security	SD	LD	N
Civilian Control			
Objective civilian control	SD	LD	N
Subjective civilian control	SD	LD	N
Military Professionalism			
Professional officer corps [armed forces, army, navy, air force]	SD	LD	N
Shared responsibility	SD	LD	N
Institutional Structures			
(Civilian leadership)			
Role of executive	SD	LD	N
Role of bureaucracy	SD	LD	N
Technical support	SD	LD	N
Role of legislature	SD	LD	N
Challenges			
Engagement of civic society	SD	LD	N
Transparency-openness to public records; press and media	SD	LD	N
Parliamentary oversight	SD	LD	N
Civil autonomous organizations present	SD	LD	N
Relations with international organization	SD	LD	N
Internal security forces	SD	LD	N
* SD= substantial discussion LD= limited discussed N= none			

The major categories of the coding sheet derived from the conceptual framework table are discussed in literature about the civil-military relations. Civil-military problematic, civilian control, military professionalism, institutional structures, and challenges are the five major categories. The topics are coded according to the amount of text in the article devoted to the topic. The scale used for the coding sheet (see table 4.1) is LD= limited discussion, SD= substantial discussion, and N= none. If an article discussed a topic such as coercive power for one paragraph or more, it was coded as SD. If a topic was mentioned in two to three sentences, then that topic was coded as LD. If an article discussed a category in general, but did not mention the topic, it was coded as LD. If a topic was not discussed at all it was coded as N.

Civil-military problematic is the first major category. It takes into account whether coercive power, balanced power, partisan neutrality, obedience to the state leadership, and functions of military other than security are discussed in an article. The second category is civilian control. It is measured by mention of objective civilian control and subjective civilian control. Military professionalism is the third category. Professional officer corps and shared responsibility are the topics measured. Institutional structures is the fourth category. The variables measured are role of executive, role of bureaucracy, technical support and role of legislature. Challenges is the last major category.

Strengths and Weaknesses of Content Analysis

Babbie (2004, 323) explains how content analysis' greatest advantage is its economy in terms of both time and money. As was done for this applied research project, a college student might use content analysis as a research tool without the need for a large

research staff or special equipment (Babbie 2004). In other words, as long as the research material to code is easily accessible, one can use content analysis (Babbie 2004). For example, in 1891, Ida B. Wells used content analysis as a research method to examine newspaper articles on “the 728 lynchings reported during the previous ten years to test the widely held assumption that black men were being lynched in the South primarily for raping white women” (Babbie 2004, 314). Oldashi identified an additional advantage as security, since “once the documents or the material are collected it is the researcher’s job to do the coding” (Oldashi 2002, 43). Safety is another great advantage of content analysis, since one might easily botch up a survey and have to repeat the whole study (Babbie 2004). However, it is easier to repeat part of a study if you use content analysis (Babbie 2004). On the other hand, subjectivity is a drawback of the content analysis method. This may create a dilemma in this applied research project, since the difference between substantial discussion and limited discussion may be very little or great (Oldashi 2002). Another disadvantage is that the categories established for the content analysis belong to the researcher and are absolute.

Population

Twenty journal articles on civil-military relations in Turkey is the population of the present applied research project. The articles were published between 1995 and 2007. Eight of the articles are from the journal *Armed Forces & Society*. *AF&S* is the leading peer-reviewed interdisciplinary and international journal in civil-military relations, the subject of this research. One of the eight articles, by Tanel Demirel of Turkey, was the second most frequently cited article in *Armed Forces & Society* in December 2006. Another article, by Aylin Guney and Petek Karatekelioglu of Turkey,

was the third most frequently cited article in *Armed Forces & Society* journal in December 2006. One of the eight *AF & S* journal articles is forthcoming; the author is Nil Satana. The remaining twelve articles are from other scholarly journals such as *Journal of Political & Military Sociology*, *Political Studies*, *International Journal of World Politics*, *Comparative Politics*, *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, and *European Journal of Political Research* (refer to table 4.2). All are well-respected journals and are rated in the Journal Citation Reports library website of Texas State University-San Marcos. The Journal Citation Reports is the resource for journal evaluation; it uses citation data drawn from over 8,400 scholarly and technical journals worldwide. *Turkish Studies* journal is indexed in DIP (Dietrich's Index Philosophicus Rare Index) and is published by the Turkish Studies Association of Princeton University. *South European Society and Politics* journal is indexed in GEOBASE, IBSS, IPSA, PSA, SCOPUS, SOPODA, and SSA. The unit of analysis is each article, and every article describes civil-military relations in Turkey.

Table 4.2 List of Articles (Population of Study)

No.	Author, Name	Year	Journal/Book	Title
1	Nil Satana	forthcoming	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	Transformation of the Turkish Military and the Path to Democracy
2	Ozkan Duman & Dimitris Tsarouhas	2006	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	“Civilization” in Greece versus “Demilitarization” in Turkey
3	Aylin Guney & Petek Karatekelioğlu	2005	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	Turkey’s EU Candidacy and Civil-Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects
4	Tanel Demirel	2005	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	Lessons of Military Regimes and Democracy: The Turkish Case in a Comparative Perspective
5	A. Kadir Varoğlu & Adnan Bicaksiz	2005	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	Volunteering for Risk: The Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces
6	Metin Heper & Joshua R. Itzkowitz-Shiffrinson	2005	<i>Journal of Political and Military Sociology</i>	Civil-Military Relations in Israel and Turkey
7	Metin Heper	2005	<i>Turkish Studies</i>	The Justice Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey
8	Metin Heper	2005	<i>South European Society & Politics</i>	The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy
9	Tanel Demirel	2004	<i>Middle Eastern Studies</i>	Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy
10	Frederic Misrahi	2004	<i>Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs</i>	The EU and the Civil Democratic Control of Armed Forces: an Analysis of Recent Developments in Turkey
11	Umit Cizre	2004	<i>European Journal of Political Research</i>	Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil-Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone
12	Tim Jacoby	2003	<i>Political Studies</i>	For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey
13	Tanel Demirel	2003	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980
14	Tanel Demirel	2003	<i>Turkish Studies</i>	Civil-Military Relations in Turkey: Two Patterns of Civilian Behavior Towards the Military
15	Nilufer Narlı	2000	<i>Turkish Studies</i>	Civil-Military Relations in Turkey
16	Metin Heper & Aylin Guney	2000	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	The Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience
17	Gerassimos Karabelias	1999	<i>Middle Eastern Studies</i>	The Evolution of Civil- Military Relations in Post-war Turkey, 1980-95
18	Nasser Momayezi	1998	<i>International Journal of World Politics</i>	Civil Military Relations in Turkey
19	Umit Cizre-Sakallioğlu	1997	<i>Comparative Politics</i>	The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy
20	Metin Heper & Aylin Guney	1995	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i>	The Military in the Third Turkish Republic

Statistics

Descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentage) are used to report the results of the content analysis. Frequency distribution and percentages sum the information discussed in the articles (Oldashi 2002). This applied research project maintains a general view of the population of articles about Turkey.

Chapter 5 Results

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the results of the content analysis of journal articles on civil-military relations in Turkey. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the content analyses using frequency distribution and percentages.

Civil-Military Problematic

The findings showed that 70% of the articles included a substantial discussion of coercive power (see table 5.1). Twenty percent of the articles discussed the civil-military problematic in a limited way, and 10% of the articles failed to discuss coercive power. Regarding balanced power, 30% of the articles examined the issue in a limited way, 40% of the articles discussed it substantially, and 30% did not discuss balanced power. Sixty percent of the articles discussed partisan neutrality substantially, 30% of the articles discussed partisan neutrality in a limited way, and 10% of the articles did not discuss partisan neutrality. Twenty-five percent of the articles discussed obedience to the state leadership in a limited way, 70% of the articles discussed it substantially, and 5% of the articles did not discuss obedience to the state leadership. Sixty-five percent of the articles did not discuss functions of military other than security, 20% of the articles discussed functions of the military other than security substantially, and 15% of the articles discussed it to a limited extent.

Overall, recent articles on the Turkish military devoted considerable attention to the civil-military problematic. Military functions other than security was the one facet of the civil-military problematic that received scant attention (65% failed to discuss it at all).

Table 5.1 Civil Military Problematic

Civil-Military Problematic N=20	Substantial discussion	Limited discussion	None	Total N=20
Coercive power	70%	20%	10%	100%
Balanced power	40%	30%	30%	100%
Partisan neutrality	60%	30%	10%	100%
Obedience to state leadership	70%	25%	5%	100%
Functions of military other than security	20%	15%	65%	100%

Civilian Control

The findings reveal that 10% of the articles discussed objective civilian control substantially, 80% of the articles discussed it to a limited extent, and 10% of the articles did not discuss objective civilian control (see table 5.2). Regarding subjective civilian control, 85% of the articles discussed subjective control in a limited way, 5% discussed it substantially, and 10% of the articles did not discuss subjective civilian control.

Both types of civilian control were alluded to in most articles, but the discussion was limited.

Table 5.2 Civilian Control

Type of control N=20	Substantial discussion	Limited discussion	None	Total N=20
Objective civilian control	10%	80%	10%	100%
Subjective civilian control	5 %	85%	10%	100%

Military Professionalism

Military professionalism was an important category. The professional officer corps was substantially discussed in 35% of the articles (see table 5.3). Fifty percent of the articles discussed the professional officer corps in a limited way, and 15% of the articles did not discuss a professional officer corps. Shared responsibility was substantially discussed in 25% of the articles and was not discussed in 45% of the articles.

Overall, recent articles on the Turkish military gave limited attention to military professionalism. Shared responsibility was a facet of military professionalism that 45% of the articles failed to discuss.

Table 5.3 Military Professionalism

Military professionalism N=20	Substantial discussion	Limited discussion	None	Total N=20
Professional officer corps	35%	50%	15%	100%
Shared responsibility	25%	30%	45%	100%

Institutional Structures

Eighty-five percent of the articles included a substantial discussion of the executive role. The role of the bureaucracy was substantially discussed in 60% of the articles. Similarly, the role of the legislature was discussed substantially in 80% of the articles. However, technical support was not discussed in 70% of the articles; it was discussed to a limited extent in 20% of the articles, and substantially discussed in 10% of the articles.

Institutional structures were discussed more than any topic so far. Technical support systems was the only facet of the institutional structures that received scant attention (70% failed to discuss it at all).

Table 5.4 Institutional Structures

Institutional Structures N=20	Substantial discussion	Limited discussion	None	Total N=20
Role of executive	85%	10%	5 %	100%
Role of bureaucracy	65%	10%	5%	100%
Technical support systems	10%	20%	70%	100%
Role of legislature	80%	15%	5%	100%

Challenges

The results show that 35% of the articles discussed engagement of civic society substantially, 50% of the articles included limited discussion, and 15% of the articles did not discuss engagement of civic society (see table 5.5). Twenty percent of the articles did not discuss parliamentary oversight, 55% of the articles included limited discussion, and 25% of the articles substantially discussed parliamentary oversight. Thirty percent of the articles discussed transparency/openness to public records, press, and media substantially; 45% of the articles did not discuss it. Twenty-five percent of the articles substantially discussed civil autonomous organizations, 25% did not discuss it, and 50% of the articles discussed civil autonomous organizations to a limited extent. Forty-five percent of the articles substantially discussed relations with international organizations, 50% of the articles discussed it to a limited extent, and only 5% of the articles did not discuss relations with international organizations. Forty-five percent of

the articles did not discuss internal security forces, 30% of the articles discussed it to a limited extent, and 25% of the articles substantially discussed internal security forces.

The challenges of emerging democracies were addressed in most articles, but the discussion was limited. Relations with international organizations and engagement of civic society received more attention than other facets of the challenges of emerging democracies in most articles. Transparency and internal security forces were the facets of challenges that received less discussion (45% of the articles failed to discuss transparency and internal security forces).

Table 5.5 Challenges of Emerging Democracies

Challenges N=20	Substantial discussion	Limited discussion	None	Total N=20
Engagement of civic society	35%	50%	15%	100%
Parliamentary oversight	25%	55%	20%	100%
Transparency-openness to public records; press and media	30%	25%	45%	100%
Civil autonomous organizations present	25%	50%	25%	100%
Relations with international organizations (EU and NATO)	45%	50%	5%	100%
Internal Security Forces	25%	30%	45%	100%

Chapter 6 Conclusions

Introduction

Chapter 6 summarizes the applied research project methodology and findings using the conceptual framework.

Summary of Findings

The purpose of this applied research project was to first highlight the basic framework scholars use to analyze civil-military relations, then to use the framework to describe the content of recent scholarly articles that examine civil-military relations in Turkey. The results of the research showed that a typical article discusses the civil-military problematic in general. A typical article included limited discussion of both objective and subjective control as part of civilian control of civil-military relations. Military professionalism was discussed to a limited extent or not at all; for example, shared responsibility is not discussed in most of the articles. Institutional structures are substantially discussed in the majority of the articles, except for the category of technical support—which is not discussed in most of the articles. The last category, challenges, is discussed to a limited extent or not at all, except for the relations with international organizations subcategory; that facet was discussed substantially in an average article. Parliamentary oversight and engagement of civic society are discussed to a limited extent; transparency/openness to public records and internal security forces are not discussed in a typical article. These and other findings appear in the summary table of all the categories and subcategories, table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Summarized table of civil-military relations as discussed in the articles

Categories	Mode
Civil-Military Problematic	
Coercive power	Substantial discussion
Balanced power	Substantial discussion
Partisan neutrality	Substantial discussion
Obedience to state leadership	Substantial discussion
Functions of military other than security	None
Civilian Control	
Objective civilian control	Limited discussion
Subjective civilian control	Limited discussion
Military Professionalism	
Professional officer corps	Limited discussion
Shared responsibility	None
Institutional Structures	
Role of executive	Substantial discussion
Role of bureaucracy	Substantial discussion
Technical support systems	None
Role of legislature	Substantial discussion
Challenges	
Engagement of civic society	Limited discussion
Parliamentary oversight	Limited discussion
Transparency, press and media	None
Relations with international organizations (EU and NATO)	Substantial discussion
Internal security forces	None

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